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Introduction
With almost 25 years in managing international trade in textiles and
clothing the industrialized countries have provided the world with a
wealth of information on how to develop, apply, and refine trade
barriers. Granted, the initiators and the signatories of the STA, LTA,
and the MFA all protrayed the measures they initiated as merely
ensuring that the necessary structural adjustments could be smoothly
effected, thereby avoiding demand for increased protection otherwise
prompted by the expected flood of imports from developing countries. It
was further emphasized that such an arrangement would allow markets for
MFA products to be openend up in an orderly and predictable manner.
Unfortunately, however, the experience over the last quarter century
bespeaks a different story. While it cannot be overlooked that
developing countries were able to increase their share in world export
2
markets for MFA products, particularly clothing, Table 1 shows that
The STAi i'.e.the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Cotton Textiles, was indeed of a short-term nature, but only because
it was turned into the LTA, i.e. the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles, one year after its ratification
in October 1961. True to its name the LTA, with extensions and/or
expansions in 1967 and 1970, lasted over a decade before being turned
into the MFA, i.e. the somewhat euphamistically termed Multifiber
Arrangement, in 1974. With its two extensions/ expansions in 1978 (MFA
II) and 1982 (MFA III), the MFA now covers almost the entire spectrum of
textiles and clothing leading up to the final manufacturing steps in the
clothing industry. For in depth overviews see Keesing and Wolf (1986),
GATT (1984), and Cable and Baker (1983). The legal ramifications of the
STA and the LTA are well treated in Dam (1970).
T1FA products are considered as covering SITC numbers 65 (textiles) and
84 (clothing)..- 2 -
TABLE 1. Percentage Share of Imports of MFA and All Manufactured Products













































































































































Notes: North America includes the USA and Canada. IC stands for industri-
alized countries, LDC for developing countries. Figures in parenthesis
refer to intra-trade, which is otherwise deleted from the statistics used.
Data are from UNCTAD.- 3 -
they are still far from being the chief supplier in the domestic markets
of the industrialized countries. Managed trade, with an ever increasing
degree of bureaucracy, has thus effectively limited competition from
LDCs. In light of the fact that the current Multifiber Arrangement is
due to expire at the end of July 1986, it seems essential that the
implications of continued protection of textiles and clothing are
clearly understood. It is particularly important to understand this
with respect to the impact on consumers, since a wider promulgation .of
these results would make it more difficult to effect tighter trade
restrictions.
Although there have been numerous other studies protraying and
3
analyzing the implications of the MFA, the approach taken in the
empirical part of this paper, where highly disaggregated data are used,
more directly reveals the considerable impact of binding trade
restrictions.
The paper begins with a brief overview of the developments leading up
to the MFA and the role played by the European Economic Community (EEC),
the largest market in the world for textiles and clothing. Next, the EEC
is used as a reference point for an overview of protectionistic measures
taken within the framework of or sanctioned by the MFA. Finally, it is
examined how these measures affected an important individual MFA product
at a low level of aggregation. This analysis is performed for shirts
3
See for example Wolf et al. (1984) or Tarr and Morkre (1984).- 4 -
imported to West Germany.
Historical Background of the MFA
The path of international agreements covering the textile and clothing
industry since World War II for a long time ran parallel but counter to
general international trade policy trends. For instance:
- whereas GATT was established to provide the legal framework
to prevent trade wars of the kind experienced around the
Great Depression and at the same time promote trade to
increase income and employment, the STA and LTA were con-
structed to provide the dispensation of measures running
counter to basic principles in the Gatt treaty.
- whereas the Kennedy and Tokyo round trade negotiations
significantly reduced tariff levels between countries or
MFA goods (Table 2), the LTA extensions and then later
the MFA counteracted the tariff cuts by imposing quotas
and inducing voluntary export restraints.
Only in the most recent years, particularly after the high
unemployment levels in industrialized countries showed almost no signs
of shrinking, but rather continued to climb, did the direction of trade
policies in general shift more noticeably in the direction of
4
Most evident has been the support for such measures in the United
States, the country basically responsible for initiating the STA and
earlier "voluntary" export restraints (VERs).- 5 -
TABLE 2. Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Percentage Distribution


























































































Notes: Pre-Kennedy Round figures are not exactly comparable with
those of other Multilateral Trade Negotiation rounds. Data are
adapted from GATT (1984, table 3.4).— 6 —
protection.
The EEC's role in supporting and participating in managed trade in
textiles is one which can initially be entitled as being subsurvient. A
a matter of fact, the STA and LTA were not even signed by the EEC but
rather by the individual member countries. It was not actually until the
second extension of the LTA in 1970 that the Community was represented as
a single signator. Thus it was essentially during the negotiations on
the replacement of the LTA that the EEC played a more prominent role in
designing and structuring the future course of managed trade and,
generally speaking, the birth of the MFA could well be considered to be
an improvement vis-a-vis the jungle of bilateral agreements under the
LTA.
At this point in time, the desire to establish a more all encompassing
agreement on international trade in textiles and clothing was
particularly strong in the United States, where domestic producers had
been coming under increasing pressure from developing countries taking
advantage of the shift from natural to man-made fibers. This not only
led to extending the LTA beyond the original area of cotton textiles,
but also caused the United States to more frequently evoke unilateral
restrictions which then were turned into bilateral "agreements". By the
early 70ties the United States had applied restrictions to imports of
But even then some existing unilateral restraints remained on the
books and were not phased out until 1977. See Cable and Baker (1983, p.
76).- 7 -
textiles and clothing from roughly 30 countries. Given the fact that the
GATT treaty was not meant to be interpreted in such a fashion and that
such actions were not covered by the LTA it became crucial for the
United States to gather support for a reform of the LTA.
Despite the fact that the EEC was not being subjected to the same
difficulties as the U.S. - perhaps because of some import restrictions
still left over from the post-war era - it agreed to proceed with
negotiatons under the umbrella of GATT. The result of this process,
concluded on the 20th of December 1973 and becoming effective on the
first of January 1974, was an arrangement which actually did provide for
a greater degree of consideration for the needs of developing countries.
Quotas were to be expanded at rates not below a minimum (i.e. 6
percent), swing provisions provided room for shifting a certain amount
of the quotas from the past or to the future and institutional
arrangements were stipulated to solve disputes, e.g. the Textiles
Surveillance Board. The general consensus between the parties concerned
following the MFA negotiations in Geneva was indeed one of satisfaction
As pointed out in a recent GATT publication (1984, p. 73), U.S.
negotiations were successful in obtaining additional voluntary export
restraints on non-cotton products from key Asian suppliers, but "the
pressures in Congress for quotas did not abate." The similarities with
the U.S. situation in the Fall of 1985 cannot be denied.
Basic to the entire agreement was the attempt to balance rights and
obligations. Whereas importing countries had the right to impose import
restrictions under specified conditions, there was also an obligation to
ensure that the reasons for the restrictions be eliminated. Likewise,
the right to impose restrictions was balanced by the obligation to abide
by the quotas, growth rates and flexibilty clauses. See GATT (1984, pp.
74-77) for a more thorough description.- 8 -
in having established the foundations for a sensible international
Q
division of labor.
The MFA in Action
For the EEC the developments soon prompted reactions not in line with
the optimistic consensus at the end of the MFA negotiations. The rapid
q
increase in imports from developing countries soon caused domestic
producers to pressure for more protection. Perhaps, if the general
international economic conditions had not worsened in the aftermath of
the 1974 oil price shock, the letter of and particularly the spirit of
the MFA might have been clearly reflected in the actual application. But
given the virtual stagnation in consumers' expenditures for clothing in
the EEC during this time period, the liberal stance read into the MFA
was becoming negated by a greater application of the rights of the
importing countries without due respect to their obligations vis-a-vis
the exporting countries.
This can be easily documented by examining the application of article
115 of the Treaty of Rome, which allows individual countries to apply
for an exemption from having to adhere to the common external tariff.
qSee Nachrichten fur den Aussenhandel, January 7, 1974.
For example, in 1974, 1975, and 1976 clothing imports increased at an
annual rate of about 30 percent as compared to an average of 6 percent
in the prior ten years.
Thus, for instance, when the textile or clothing industry of a given
country feels that it is being subjected to "injuries" from imports, the
government can apply for permission to the EEC to be allowed to take- 9 -
TABLE 3. Special Protection Measures in the EEC Against Foreign





































































































Source: Own calculations based on EEC official registry.- 10 -
As is evident from Table 3, the number of such requests from the MFA
industries was no more than a third of all such applications in 1973 and
1975. By 1977, however, they amounted to 60 percent and in 1981 to
almost 80 percent.
Of the countries taking advantage of this option to effect additional
protection France and the Benelux countries accounted for by far the
greatest share. Up through 1981, over 50 percent of the applications of
Article 115 to MFA products were instituted by these countries. In the
latest year, however, it was Ireland which, after rapidly increasing its
share year after year since 1977, almost evoked this article as often as
the next two, i.e. France and the Benelux countries, combined. Germany's
role as a moderate, with the exception of one year, is clearly
documented, as is that of Denmark.
But most interesting and perhaps surprising at first is the relatively
moderate role played by Italy, the one country in the EEC with a
positive trade balance in MFA products. Particularly in the area of
clothing, precisely in the area where Article 115 was applied the most
according to table 4, was Italy able to expand its share of markets
within the EEC. This development is reflected, for instance, in the
large increase in the intra-trade share as a percentage of consumption
in Table 1. What at first glance seems to be surprising is actually
individual actions against the country exporting the products in
question. See Dartel (1983) for details of the application of Article
115 EEC to trade with textiles.-11-
























































Notes: The product groups were classified as follows in terms
of BTN numbers:
Fibres: 5001-03, 5301-5, 5401-02, 5501-04, 5601-04, 5701-04,
and 6301-02
Yarns: 5004-07, 5101-03, 5201, 5306-10, 5304, 5505-06, 5605-06,
and 5706-07
Fabrics: 5009, 5104, 5202, 5311-12, 5405, 5507-09, 5607, 5710-11,
5804, 5808, 5907-08, 5911, 5913, and 6001
Made-up Articles: 5801-03, 5805-07, 5809-10, 5901-06, 5910, 5912,
5914-17, and 6201-05
Clothing: 6002-06, 6101-11, 6501-05.
The Total includes products not listed separately. The figures
are not necessarily comparable with those of other tables
using aggregation by country because some applications of
Art. 115 by a given country include more than one four digit
BTN. Data are from EEC, Official Journal, respective years.- 12 -
quite logical once consideration is given to the mode of clothing
production in Italy: it is essentially a cottage industry, working to a
large degree in the underground economy. Hence, neither are numerous
large firms present to exact pressure on the government to apply for
additional protection in Brussels, nor does the government seem to have
perceived of an urgent need to step in on behalf of workers being
"threatened" by imports. In other words, the existence of a wide-spread,
largely underground cottage industry acts as a brake on protectionistic
tendencies. The above mentioned developments in Ireland can be
interpreted in a similar vein. That is, the cottage system for clothing
manufacturing is but of minor importance or rather the tax system
functions well enough so as to hinder working underground and earning
money net of taxes. The factories, in which garments are produced, are
not only subjected to increased competition from LDCs, they are located
in areas suffering from very high unemployment. The politics of MFA
protection in Ireland can thus be viewed as a crucial holding game,
which is no doubt keeping more and more firms from effecting the
necessary measures. In Italy, on the other hand, the adjustments occur
to a far greater degree via the price mechanism, directly in the factor
market and thus induce economically efficient solutions in the clothing
sector.
A closer examination of Table 4 shows that the shares for fabrics and
clothing have not changed significantly over time. Together, they
account for about 90 percent of all applications of Article 115 to MFA
products. Underlying this generalvtrend is a noticeable correlation- 13 -
between a surge in the application of Article 115 in a specific four
digit BTN-group and the subsequent ebbing of cases in this area, an
obvious indication of how the quotas are biting. Disaggregating even
further to four digit BTNs and major suppliers the shifting from areas
subjected to Article 115 and new areas becomes quite noticeable. Table 5
examines major EEC suppliers with respect to the application of Article
115 in the area of fabrics and clothing. The shifting is discernable
only in an indirect manner, namely in the persistance with which
countries like Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan appear in the listings.
Likewise the category Other LDCs implicitly reveals how new suppliers
are quickly called to order, not so much on the basis of the volume of
their exports to the EEC, but rather on the rate of growth at which
they are expanding. Hence the contention that the MFA allows countries
coming on stream to enjoy better and more secure access is proving to be
true at an increasingly lower level. Such was for instance the case for
Bangladesh, which heeded the advice of the developed world that the only
way out of its permanent dependence on aid was to diversify exports into
non-traditional areas. It did so and began to forcefully expand the
manufacturing of shirts in the early 80ties. In December of 1984, Great
Britain and France applied for application of Article 115 to restrict
12 the import of shirts from Bangladesh. Bangladesh, which up to that
,~This aspect will receive closer examination in the empirical section.
It should also be noted that the United States, to which most of the
exports of garments were being shipped, also applied quotas to
Bangladesh. These now cover four categories with four more to be
negotiated in November 1984 and two others on the "watch list". With an
internal quota allocation system in effect, these quotas together with- 14 -
TABLE 5. The Application of Article 115 to EEC Imports of Selected
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Notes: The percentages are calculated with respect to the bottom
line of Table 4. Data sources are given in the same table.- 15 -
point in time was not covered by an explicit EEC quota, joined the ranks
of a club, which is rapidly becoming less and less exclusive.
To summarize the above, it perhaps suffices to note that the initial
liberal stance taken by the EEC vis-a-vis the MFA soon gave way to a
rapid increase in the application of article 115 and then to a
tightening up of the restraints in MFA II and MFA III. It remains now to
be seen what the specific impact of these measures meant in terms of
prices, quantities and welfare losses in the EEC.
Quantifying the Effects of the MFA: the Case of Shirts
To illustrate the impact of the MFA we move from the general EEC level
to a particular country, Germany. As we have seen, Germany is one of
the more liberal EEC-members when it comes to import restrictions in
textiles and clothing. Hence any conclusions drawn from this case are
bound to be on the conservative side if one tries to apply the German
experience to other EEC-members. The product group we have chosen for
the impact analysis is shirts for men and boys. The quantitive
importance of this product group is exemplified by the fact that shirt
imports alone make up close to 8 percent of total clothing imports of
Germany for 1980.
what has already been shipped, has meant that roughly only two months of
the annual production capacity has been utilized for exports. The
survival of the firms depends now on how successful they are in
restructering production and/or sales channels.- 16 -
The Model
The following calculations are based on the assumption that Germany can
be considered a small country with respect to the imports of shirts.
This assumption seems well justified given the fact that imports are
several times as large as domestic production. If one also assumes that
imported shirts are perfect substitutes for domestically produced
shirts, the domestic price p is related to the world price pw by the
equation
(1) p = PW (1 + T
n) (1 + T )
where T is a nominal tariff and T the ad valorem equivalent of the
MFA related quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs). Equation (1)
implies, of course, that import supply is infinitely elastic.
Import demand is modeled as a function of disposable income (YD),
domestic price (p), MFA related quotas and VERs (QT), and a vector of
other determinants denoted by G.
m = m(YD, p, QT, G)
+ - -
where the expected signs of the partial derivatives are given below, and
where dQT>0 is to be interpreted as a tighter quota.
For a small country facing infinitely elastic import supply, it is
straightforward to derive that the change in imports dm induced by a
tariff T is given by the equation
x
(2) dm = -n m2 _
1 + T- 17 -
where x is the import demand elasticity and m« imports at the time of
the tariff. For given values of dm, nu, and x
m, this equation can also
be used to derive the tariff equivalent of a quota or other non-tariff
barrier to trade. In fact, this is the way the equation is used in the
present context. x is interpreted as the tariff equivalent of the MFA
quotas and VERs. For constant nominal tariffs, x then also equals the
percentage price increase that is brought about by the quantitative
import restrictions of the MFA.
The welfare loss to the importing country of the MFA related trade
13 restrictions can best be explained using Figure 1. Given import demand
curve D', the country is importing m at world price pw in the case of
free trade. An ad valorem tariff x rotates D' to the left generating
curve DN, the net import demand curve facing exporters to the country
after imposition of a tariff. Imports are reduced to m,• Distance AB is
> i
the resulting price increase. P, equals pw (1 +x ). Further restricting
imports to the quota level m« raises price to p7, which equals
pw(l + x ) (1+x )• The magnitude of the welfare loss deriving from
the import quota m« depends on the assumptions made with respect to the
quota rents.
A lower bound estimate of the welfare loss results if one assumes that
the quota rent is captured by the importing country. This may be the
case, at least to some extent, if the importing country operates
13
The diagram is adapted from Tarr and Morkre (1984, figure 5.1).- 18 -
FIGURE 1. Welfare Loss due to Trade Restrictions
c
V 1
ft JV.- 19 -
powerful buying organizations in the exporting countries and quotas are
controlled jointly. In this case, imports continue to be bought at pw
on the world market. Tariff revenue to the government equals area DCP,P
and importers capture area CEP2P-, as a quota rent. Compared to the
situation without a quota the welfare loss to the country amounts to the
area ABED, of which area ABCD is lost tariff revenue and triangle BEC
part of the loss in consumer surplus.
An upper bound estimate of the welfare loss is based on the assumption
that the quota rent is captured by the exporting countries. This is a
likely outcome if the quota is solely controlled by the exporting
countries. In this case, importers face an import price equal to p
rather than pw for imports of size nu. The difference between p and p
is the quota premium attached to the right to export to the protected
country. The deadweight loss to the importing country consists of
quadrilateral ABED and quota rent DFP P .
In either case, the welfare loss to consumers minus the welfare gain
to producers of the quota m« is given by area BEP~P, • It is a standard
exercise to decompose this welfare loss into the loss incurred by
consumers (LC) and the gain enjoyed by producers (PG). The former
equals
LC = 0.5 T pj (Cj + C2)
where T is the tariff equivalent of the quota m~. C~ denotes domestic
consumption in the presence and C, in the absence of the quota. C, is- 20 -
calculated as
Cj = (1 - x n) C2 with n < 0
where n is the domestic demand elasticity. The gain to producers is
calculated similarly as
GP = 0.5 T pl (Q1 + Q2)
where Q, and Q2 are domestic production without and with the quota,
respectively. Q, is derived as
Qj = (1 - T e) Q2 with e > 0
where e is the domestic supply elasticity. All three elasticities, i.e.
n, E, and n"
1. are related to each other via the familiar excess
demand elasticity formula
(3) n
m = n (C/m) - e (Q/m).
Empirical Results
To implement the model empirically, the import demand equation is
estimated on data relating to shirts for men and boys made out of
synthetics and cotton, that is BTN trade classification numbers 61.03.11
and 61.03.15, respectively.
The import demand equation was estimated for the years 1965 to 1984.
The preferred version is- 21 -
In in = -13.89 + 3.06 In YD - 1.10 In p
m + 1.51 In cpi - .326 DMFA
(6.9) (-1.8) (2.3) (-2.7)
R
2 = 0.974 DW = 1.86 BP(4) = 5.97 Q(5) = 7.63
CUSUM = 0.448 CUSUM
2 = 0.213
where the prefix In denotes natural logarithms. YD is disposable income
deflated by the consumer price index with base year 1980 (cpi). For
lack of a domestic price at the producer or wholesale level, the import
unit value p
m had to be substituted for p. The dummy variable DMFA is
unity for the years 1978 to 1984. It is supposed to capture the
reduction in imports resulting from the quotas and VERs of the second
phase of the MFA (1978-82) and the first two years of its third phase.
To check the statistical adequacy of the equation, t-values are provided
in parenthesis. BP(n) is the test statistic for the Breusch-Pagan test
for heteroskedasticity. Q(n) is the Box-Pierce Q-statistic for nth order
autocorrelation. Both statistics are distributed as chi-squared with n
degrees of freedom. CUSUM identifies the respective test for the
constancy of parameter estimates as developed by Brown, Durbin, and
Evans (1975). CUSUM
2 refers to the associated CUSUM of squares test.
None of the reported statistics are significant at any reasonable level
of data confidence. Hence, the equation does not seem to be subject to
any obvious specification error.
The parameter of the greatest interest in the present context is the
coefficient of the dummy variable DMFA. Its magnitude implies that
without the MFA restrictions, imports of shirts would have been higher
14 by 38.5 percent, on average, in each year from 1978 to 1984. As one- 22 -
would expect, this value is somewhat higher than the import reduction of
30 percent reported by Zietz (1985) for the total of the German clothing
industry. The value is quite similar to the assumptions underlying the
paper by Tarr and Morkre (1984, table 5.3). There a range of between 12
and 38 percent is used for the increase in U.S. imports of cotton shirts
from Hong Kong. Upon substituting the percent increase in imports
along with the price elasticity of import demand (-1.1) into equation
(2) one can calculate a value of 0.539 for T , the ad valorem equivalent
of the MFA related quotas and VERs. As noted above in the theoretical
section, T also represents the average price increase per year induced
by the MFA. As such it forms the basis for the following estimates of
the welfare losses resulting from the quotas of the second and third
phase of the MFA.
The relative size of the welfare loss is reported in Table 6. The
calculations are based on average quantities and values for the years
1978 to 1984. For the lower bound estimates it is assumed that the
14
This is derived by taking the exponent of 0.326 and subsequently
subtracting unity.
For other clothing products, however, for example sweaters and
trousers, their assumed values are more than twice this size.
Using a somewhat different approach Witteler (1985, Table A46) reports
ad valorem equivalents of all import restrictions combined (including
nominal tariffs) of two to three times this size for shirts imported to
Germany.
Import quantity, import unit value, and nominal tariff are 88.612
mill., 8.93 DM, and 0.17, respectively. The nominal tariff is taken from
Galli (1982). It might be noted that for mens and boys shirts being
produced in 1985 for export from Bangladesh the average price was about
US$2.50 or approximately DM 6.50. The suggested retail price was
generally 300 percent higher.- 23 -
TABLE 6. Welfare Loss Due to MFA Quotas for Shirts as
Percentage of Import Value of Shirts - Germany
Consumption Distortion
Quota Rent










Notes: Consumption Distortion refers to the quadrilateral
ABDE of Figure 1. The average import value of shirts
for 1978-84 is DM 789.8 mill.- 24 -
historical import unit values equal the world price pw. For the upper
bound estimates the observed import unit values are assumed to equal P
and the world price pw is derived by adjusting this value by the quota
premium reported by Tarr and Morkre (1984, Table 5.1) for U.S. imports
18 of cotton shirts from Hong Kong. The deadweight loss to the country
amounts to approximately DM 148 million per year for the lower bound
19 estimate and DM 213 million per year for the upper bound estimate.
This is approximately 19 and 27 percent, respectively, of the average
import value of shirts from all sources for the years 1978-84. These
numbers are slightly higher than the corresponding figures that are
implicit in the work of Tarr and Morkre (1984). Their results imply a
20 percentage loss of between 14.2 and 20.4 percent per year for the U.S.
Although the estimates of the welfare loss reported in Table 6 are
impressive in their own right, the numbers pale when compared to the
loss incurred by consumers. Table 7 presents the results of decomposing
quadrilateral BEP2P, of Figure 1 into the gain captured by producers and
the loss incurred by consumers owing to the quotas of the second and
21 third phase of the MFA. For the range of domestic demand elasticities
18
,gThe authors set the quota premium at 11.5 percent of the import price.
The quota rent is implicitly assumed to be distributed among all
countries exporting to Germany. This implies that countries not subject
to a quota will raise their export price along with those countries that
are subject to quotas.
The percentages are based on a reported quota rent of $US 12.17 mill.,
a consumption distortion of between $US 3.4 and 10.2 mill., and a value
of imports of $US 109.2 mill, for imports of cotton shirts for men and
boys from Hong Kong.
For each assumed value of the domestic demand elasticity, equation (3)
implies a corresponding value of the domestic supply elasticity given- 25 -
TABLE 7. Welfare Gain to Producers and Welfare Loss to Consumers























Note: Calculations are based on the assumptions associated with
the lower bound estimates of table 6.- 26 -
analyzed, the loss in consumer surplus amounts to approximately three
times the size of the total economic loss (upper bound estimates)
presented in Table 6. This is equivalent to 80 to 90 percent of the
22 total average import value of shirts for the period 1978-82.
The results reported so far suggest that total imports of shirts into
Germany were reduced considerably for the second and third phase of the
MFA. They underestimate, however, the impact the MFA has had on
individual exporting countries that are subject to quotas and VERs. In
that respect, one has to consider that the import demand equation is
estimated for imports coming from all sources, including imports from
developed countries that are not subject to restrictions. To identify
how the MFA restrictions impacted upon the imports of individual
exporting countries, import demand equations would have to be estimated
for individual exporters. To provide a representative example this is
done for the case of Yugoslavia. German imports of cotton and synthetic
shirts from this country can be represented by the equation
the estimated value of n . To avoid negative values for the domestic
supply elasticity or domestic production in the absence of the MFA
import quotas, the range of values for the domestic demand elasticity
was restricted to the range -0.6 to -0.9.
For the U.S., it has been suggested that the welfare loss to consumers
of the MFA restrictions in 1984 amounted to $US 23 bill, or 135 percent
of total imports of textiles and clothing. See Asian Wallstreet Journal,
May 31, 1985 for the welfare loss and Gatt (1985) for the import data.- 27 -
In m - -46.87 + 8.90 In YD - 2.00 In p
m - .646 DYUG
(9.8) (-4.0) (-4.3)
R
2 = 0.954 DW = 1.79 BP(3) = 10.07 Q(5) = 8.54
CUSUM =1.107. CUSUM
2 = 0.23
The equation is estimated for the period 1965 to 1984. The dummy
variable DYUG is unity for the years 1978-82 only, since Yugoslavia was
not subject to shirt quotas during the third phase of the MFA. Both the
Breusch-Pagan and the CUSUM statistic are marginally significant at the
5 percent level. Since none of the other reported statistics, however,
point to any problems, the specification is accepted as adequate.
: The coefficient of the dummy variable DYUG indicates that without the
restrictions of the" MFA, imports from Yugoslavia would have exceeded
actual levels for 1978-82 by about 91 percent. This percentage figure
is in excess of twice the size of the figure calculated for imports of
shirts from all sources. These quantitive results strongly support what
was said earlier about the disastrous impact of • the MFA on particluar
developing countries such as Bangladesh.
Conclusion
When the MFA was originally conceived, there was hope that at least in
comparison with its predecessor agreements STA and LTA the new
arrangement would lay the ground for a more liberal and orderly trade
regime in textiles and clothing. As experience has taught the trade
regime actually turned more orderly in a sense but certainly not more- 28 -
liberal. The era of relative liberalism was short-lived indeed. It did
not outlast the first two to three years of MFA I. What followed was a
surge in import quotas and voluntary export restraints negotiated and
enacted under the rules of the MFA. Trade in textiles and clothing
became more orderly in the sense that gradually a significant part of it
was conducted under binding, tightly controlled, bilateral or
multilateral agreements of export restraint with developing countries,
particularly those of Asia. For a sizable number of them, in particular
newcomers such as Bangladesh, the MFA has virtually destroyed any hope
to replicate the earlier success stories of countries such as Hong Kong
that were characterized by export led growth on the basis of
labor-intensive industries such as clothing. As the case study of
Germany has shown, the MFA has also had a considerable impact on
developed countries. For consumers, the consequences of trade
restrictions of the MFA type have meant paying prices far in excess of
what would have been the case without trade restrictions. The huge
welfare losses for Germany speak for themselves. One wonders in this
connection what kind of welfare losses one may expect to see for other
EEC countries which, almost without exception, have enacted far more
restrictive trade regimes than Germany.- 29 -
References
Brown, R.L., Durbin, J., and J.M. Evans, Techniques for Testing the
Constancy of Regression Relationships over Time. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society Ser. B, Vol. 37 (1975): 149-92.
Cable, Vincent, and Betsy Baker, World Textile Trade and Production
Barriers. Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 152,
London, 1983.
Dam, Kenneth, The GATT ^ Law and International Economic Organization.
Chicago, 1970.
Dartel, R.J.P.M.,The Conduct of the EEC's Textile Trade Policy and the
Application of Article 115 EEC, in: Bourgeois, J.H.J. et al.,
Protectionism and the European Community. Deventer, Netherlands:
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983.
Galli, Anton, Textil- und Bekleidungsindustrie. In: Galli, A.,
Helmschrott, H. und W. Orchel, Wechselwirkungen von Entwicklungs-
politik, Handels-, Struktur- und Beschaftigungspolitik.
Forschungsberichte des Bundesministeriums fur Wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit, Bd. 33, Kbln 1982.
Gatt, Recent Developments in Demand, Production, and Trade in Textiles
and Clothing. Com.Tex/W/167, Geneva 1985.
, Study on Textiles and Clothing in the World Economy. Geneva, 1984.
Keesing, Donald B. and Martin Wolf, Textile Quotas against Developing
Countries., 2nd ed., London: Trade Policy Research Centre,
forthcoming 1986.
Tarr, David G. and Morris E. Morkre, Aggregate Costs to the United
States of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports: General Tariff Cuts and
Removal of Quotas on Automobiles, Steel, Sugar, and Textiles. Bureau
of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D.C., 1984.
UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. New
York, various issues.
Witteler, Doris, Quantifizierung nichttarifarer Handelshemmnisse.
Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Analyse fur die Sektoren
Textilien und Bekleidung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Diss.,
Minister, 1985.- 30 -
Wolf, Martin, Glismann, Hans H., Pelzman, Joseph, and Dean Spinanger,
Costs of Protecting Jobs in Textiles and Clothing. Thames Essay No.
37, London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1984.
Zietz, Joachim, Some Econometric Evidence on the Impact of the
Multifiber Agreement on the German Clothing Industry. Kiel Working
Paper No. 238, August 1985.